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Reflection Paper on Smart Defence: The Indirect Approach 
 
”This is the time to make better use of NATO as an adviser and an honest broker. (...) 
NATO’s role is to set the strategic direction, to identify possible areas of cooperation, 
to act as a clearing house, and to share best practices.” SG Rasmussen, 04 FEB 11 
 
I : Enable Groups of Nations to Move Forward with Smart Defence 
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Generally, NATO is better off assisting nations in smart defence than creating NATO-wide solu-
tions. NATO must think in generic frameworks – and supply concrete models for nations to 
employ. Taking the cue from Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) and the Baltic De-
fence College, NATO should enable other groups of member states to proceed with cooperation. 
At a minimum this would mean to share MOUs, etc. More ambitiously, this means to gather and 
analyse best practices; to develop concrete (but generic) document templates for nations to use; 
and to encourage cooperation e.g. through informal ‘speed dating’ to identify potential coop-
erative nations and areas.  
 
II : Pool and Share Non-Operative Capabilities, Enablers, and Highly Specialised Capabili-
ties 
Generally, think of economies of scale through more effective business processes, not war-
fighting. Non-operative aspects of defence are less sensitive: Share and pool e.g. education 
(shared military academies like the Baltic Defence College) and training/proving grounds. 
Consider private sector models for acquisition and storage/stockpile management, especially for 
back-office utilities (with a view of creating an internal market for defence services). In operative 
area focus on enablers such as logistics, intelligence, C4ISR, etc. Use the new Generic Planning 
Situations as specialised versions of the NRF for shared force planning. Shared rotation of 
highly specialised capabilities: Buy only one active duty capability (such as SM-3 missiles for 
Allied frigates doing missile defence). 
 
III : Assist Nations in Reforming Defence Planning Processes 
 
Instead of focusing solely on the NATO Defence Planning process (DPP), NATO should con-
tinuously assist nations in improving their actual defence planning processes. ‘Capability 
based planning’ is not yet implemented in nations. ACT can act as clearing house, best practice 
identifier and process consultants. To do so, ACT must increasingly see nations as customers too. 
 
IV: NATO as OECD: ACT Should Take Lead 
The Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD) generates best practices 
about how to run a modern state and shares them with its member nations. NATO should be in-
spired by the way the OECD works when it is to advise nations, act as a clearing house and share 
best practices. ACT is well-suited to spearhead efforts to enable nations to implement smart 
defence – and could win much by including and consulting with nations’ defence think tanks. 
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